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I. Background 
Since the introduction of corporation laws in the individual German states during the 
first half of the 19
th Century, Germany has repeatedly amended and reformed its company 
law.  Such reforms and amendments were prompted in part by stock exchange fraud and 
the collapse of large corporations, but also by a routine adjustment of law to changing 
commercial and societal conditions.  During the last ten years, a series of significant 
changes to German company law led one commentator to speak from a "company law in 
permanent reform."  Two years ago, the German Federal Chancellor established a 
Regierungskommission Corporate Governance ("Government Commission on Corporate 
Governance") and instructed it to examine the German Corporate Governance system and 
German company law as a whole, and formulate recommendations for reform. 
What are the causes for the current round of reforms in German company law, and 
what are the goals of these reforms? 
 First, in recent years there have been a number of cases in which large 
companies have collapsed in connection with criminal behavior on the part of 
their management or because of failures in the corporate governance system 
used in these companies; 
 Second, German companies that are listed both at home and on the exchanges 
of foreign countries are confronted with the requirements that apply in such 
countries.  And from the other direction, multinational institutional investors 
often include German companies in their portfolios and thus bring their 
international market expectations into the German market.  This 
internationalization of the supply and demand of capital serves to level 
country-specific differences in corporate governance rules. 
 Germany is reforming its pension system toward a model that is partly based 
on institutional investors managing privately invested capital.  This 
development will bring significant changes into the German capital markets, 
broaden the range of participating investors, and demand further reform of the 
regulatory environment. 
 A "competition of regulators" in Europe is becoming increasingly important.  
This includes the development of a company law that meets the needs of the 
market. 
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 Companies that are financed by venture capital require a more flexible 
company law. 
 
II. The Report of the Government Commission on Corporate 
Governance: Drafting and Implementation 
 
In July of 2001, the Commission submitted a report to the Government containing 
about 150 recommendations on how the German system of corporate governance should 
be improved and how company law should be amended to implement the recommended 
measures
1. The Commission collected information for the preparation of its report through 
a detailed questionnaire that it prepared and dispatched to various company law and 
business experts and trade associations, both in Germany and abroad.  The Commission 
studied the answers to these questionnaires and supplemented them with the responses to 
follow-up discussions with experts and associations.  The Commission both prepared and 
solicited the preparation of numerous memoranda on solutions that foreign law offered to 
individual problems.  In particular, the Commission studied the planned reform of English 
company law, and to this end a group of the Commission's members established contact 
with the English Reform Commission at the DTI. 
The Commission's report was welcomed by both the current government and the 
opposition party, so it is reasonable to assume that its main recommendations will be 
implemented into German law, even if there is a change of government following the 
elections to be held this autumn.  Implementation should take place in three steps: 
1.  The Code of Best Practice 
 
The first step, drafting a Code of Best Practice, is now complete
2.  In the past, a 
number of private initiatives by market participants in Germany had developed codes 
along these lines.  The Government Commission recommended that a commission be 
appointed to study the existing codes and develop a single, uniform Code of Best Practice.  
A former chairman of the management board of Thyssen-Krupp, Mr. Gerhard Cromme, 
was named to chair the Code Commission, and the Code was published in February of 
2002.  The Code applies to listed companies, but is not mandatory, and rather operates on 
a "comply or explain" basis. 
                                                 
1 Cf. the translation of the summary of recommendations sub VII, below. 
2 Cf. German Corporate Governance Code (www.corporate-governance-code.de/index-e.html ) 
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2.  Initial Implementing Legislation 
 
The second step, implementation of our recommendations into German law, has also 
been completed.  Promptly after the Commission's report was submitted, the Government 
prepared draft legislation amending the German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz), in 
the form of a “Law for the Further Reform of Corporation Law, Accounting Law, and of 
Transparency and Publicity” (Gesetz zur weiteren Reform des Aktien- und Bilanzrechts, zu 
Transparenz und Publizität
3).  This legislation was recently approved by the German 
Parliament and will enter into force in August of this year.  This reform of company law 
essentially has two elements:  
 first, the legislation implements a "comply or explain" principle.  That is, the 
management and supervisory organs of all listed companies must state in their 
annual financial statements that are released to the markets whether they have 
complied and intend to comply with the Code of Best Practice, or explain why 
they do not or intend not to comply with individual provisions of the Code; and 
 second, the legislation addresses certain of the Commission's 
recommendations, that as a matter of law and policy, can be carried into law 
before the end of the legislative term. 
3.  Comprehensive Reform of Company law 
 
It will not be possible to realize the third step of implementation until after the 
beginning of the next legislative term.  This third step will be a comprehensive reform of 
German company law based on the recommendations of the Commission.  The following 
sections address the main aspects of this reform. 
 
III. National versus European Regulation 
 
The Government Commission's report does not contain express statements regarding 
the relationship between national and supranational (European Community) legal systems.  
However, because the Commission prepared recommendations for the national legislator, 
and because such recommendations were to be implemented through national legislation, 
the Commission's position in this regard was clear. 
                                                 
3 Bundesrat-Drucksache 450/2 (31.05.2002). 
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It is not necessary at this time for me to repeat the many reasons why a continued 
harmonization of European company law should not be pursued.  Recently, the Bolkestein 
commission has requested a group of company law experts to prepare a questionnaire 
focusing directly on the development of company law in Europe
4.  Hopefully this group of 
company law experts will take a position in clear contrast to the policy of harmonization 
that was previously pursued in Europe, and focus on those aspects of company law that are 
genuinely transnational. 
IV. The Two-Tier System 
As early as 1870, Germany traded in the board model – or one-tier system – for a 
two tier arrangement of corporate management and supervisory organs.  The original idea 
was to give shareholders, who are hampered, as is well known, by collective action 
dilemmas, a representative body (Aufsichtsrat  – supervisory board) to protect their 
interests against the management board (Vorstand), thereby ameliorating the potential 
conflicts in the principal-agent relationship between investor and manager.  This 
supervisory board model was later amended to include another stakeholder – i.e., 
employees – and to give them rights to exercise control within the company and 
participate in deliberations. 
The division between a management board (Vorstand) on the one side and a 
supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) on the other corresponds to the division between "inside" 
directors and "outside" directors as used in the one-tier model.  Whether these two 
functions are placed in a single, or in two separate bodies is only of secondary 
significance.  The Government Commission saw no convincing reason to deviate from the 
traditional German model.  In practice, a certain degree of convergence of the two systems 
is visible.  In the one-tier system, there in an increasing tendency to divide the functions of 
the chairman from those of the chief executive officer ("CEO"), board subcommittees are 
being staffed with a majority of outside directors, and there is an insistence that outside 
directors be adequately "independent".  In the spirit of this convergence movement, the 
Government Commission attempted to improve the information available to the 
supervisory board, give it positve and negative incentives in order to improve the 
efficiency of its work, and thus increase the quality of a company's strategic direction and 
supervision of management.  However, there appear to be limits to just how far this 
                                                 
4 „A Modern Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe: A Consultative Document of the High 
Level Group of Company Law Experts“, Brussels (2002). 
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convergence movement can go, and one such limit is found in employee co-determination, 
a topic that I address in detail below. 
The Government Commission did discuss whether it should recommend giving 
companies the option of choosing between a one and a two-tier structure, as is done in 
France.  Giving companies such a choice appeared to be an attractive solution.  However, 
the Commission decided not to make such a recommendation, both because an optional 
choice of this kind would require significant and technically difficult changes to the Stock 
Corporation law and also because the question must in any case be reconsidered in light of 
the possibility of establishing a European Company under the Council's recently adopted 
Regulation. 
 
V. Co-Determination 
 
Austria, Germany, Sweden, and The Netherlands have co-determination systems that 
while broadly similar, present significant differences in their details (the French system is 
again optional).  To date, there have been no undisputed econometric studies on the 
(negative or positive) correlation between co-determination and company performance.  
For this reason, and because the institution of co-determination is generally accepted in 
Germany as an effective social compromise, any suggestion to eliminate co-determination 
in Germany would have to be approached with care. 
The Government Commission placed the question of co-determination in brackets 
simply as a working compromise because of the time the question would have demanded – 
not because it thought that no changes were necessary.  Indeed, the opposite is the case.  
The co-determination laws arose in a completely different economic and political 
environment.  For example, when parity co-determination (i.e., half of the supervisory 
board of a company with more than 2,000 employees is filled by representatives of the 
employees) was introduced in 1976, Deutsche Bank AG was still a "German" bank in the 
true sense of the word: the great majority of its employees were employed in Germany, 
and the banks revenues were generated primarily in Germany.  Today, Deutsche Bank 
employs as many persons in each of New York and London as it does in Frankfurt, and the 
bulk of its revenues are generated abroad.  Regardless of this situation, only the employees 
in Germany have a right to elect representatives to the supervisory board.  It is clear that 
this is not an acceptable model for an international holding company in the long run.   
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International holding companies with their registered offices in The Netherlands are 
exempted from the Dutch co-determination law.  This is an example of a solution that 
should be studied carefully for possible application in Germany.  In the long run, the 
markets will not tolerate that national interests are a relevant factor in decisions such as the 
opening or closing of a manufacturing unit of an internationally operative company. 
VI. Selected Recommendations 
1.  The Management Board 
a)  Stock Options and Similar Programs 
 
It is perhaps interesting for an international audience for me to shed some light on 
the German law treatment of executive management compensation, in particular, stock 
option and long-term incentive plans.  In recent years, publicly listed companies in 
Germany have greatly inflated the amounts of compensation paid to executive 
management and changed the existing structures of compensation (fixed, performance-
linked salaries and bonuses, and long-term incentive plans), and they have done so 
refering to a need to meet (questionable) international standards.  Regretfully, these 
German companies have not felt a like urgency to meet international transparency 
standards.  Under German law, shareholder approval is not necessary for the creation of a 
stock option plan, but it is necessary for an increase in capital to create new shares or the 
repurchase of outstanding shares that will be used for the option plan.  In this context, one 
would expect that it would be required to disclose the value, value range, or potential 
value of the plan to the shareholders so they could understand the degree of dilution that 
their equity holdings could suffer as a result of the plan's adoption.  However, this is not 
the case.  To this end, the Government Commission recommended that the Code of Best 
Practices require the drafting of a report on the value of any proposed plan and its 
submission to the shareholders' meeting.  I regret to say that the Code Commission did not 
accept this recommendation. 
It would also be useful to disclose the structure and value of stock option plans on an 
annual basis in the notes to the annual financial statements or business report.  The 
Government Commission recommended this measure as well, but also on this point the 
Code Commission decided to include only a vague requirement: 
“The concrete details of a stock option plan shall be disclosed in a suitable 
form” (No. 4.2.3 Code of Best Practices).  “The compensation of the members 
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of the management board shall be reported in the notes to the consolidated 
financial statements, broken down into their fixed, performance-linked, and 
long-term incentive components.  The figures should be presented on an 
individual basis” (No. 4.2.4 Code of Best Practices). 
Another, related topic is the manner in which stock options are evidenced on a 
company's income statement.  According to a proposal submitted by the German 
Accounting Standards Board it would appear that the value of an option should be 
recorded as an expense
5.  However, the relevant nationally applicable standard has not yet 
been promulgated. 
A last topic that should be addressed under this heading is the determination of 
performance targets.  The Government Commission expressed the position that a 
performance target may not be merely an increase in the relevant company's share price by 
x percent.  I regret to say that also on this point the Code Commission chose not to follow 
our recommendation, and expressly permits companies to fix as performance targets a 
mere increase in their share price.  This allows windfall profits and the rewarding of 
under-performance in a rising market.  This should not be permitted. 
The Government Commission recommended not to impose an absolute cap on the 
income received through a stock option plan because such caps could be inappropriate for 
any given company taken on an individual basis.  However, it is worth considering 
whether a supervisory board should be asked to develop an individual cap for its own 
company and to impose and publish such cap.   
b). Liability  and  Enforcement 
In theory, the liability of board members to the company under German law has a 
sharp bite.  As in Anglo-American legal principles, German law distinguishes between a 
breach of duty of care and a breach of duty of loyalty.  For matters involving the duty of 
care, a presumption in favor of management is created by application of the business 
judgement rule. As a practical matter however, a director is only held liable when the 
company is subject to insolvency proceedings or when the company defends itself against 
the claims of a (in most cases terminated) director.  German company law does not allow 
derivative suits (actio pro socio) that could be filed by any, individual shareholder.   
Rather, a shareholder must hold five per cent of the company's shares or have a holding 
with a nominal value of at least €  500,000 in order to file a similar action.  The 
                                                 
5 German Accounting Standard Nr. 11 (E-DRS 11), www.standardsetter.de/drsc/doc/11.pdf  
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Government Commission recommended that, for cases of gross negligence or intentional 
action, the German legislator reduce this threshold to one per cent or a stock exchange or 
market value of € 100,000. 
2.  The Supervisory Board 
As mentioned above, there are no current plans in Germany to make changes to the 
two-tier board system or the right of employee co-determination.  In the future, the 
supervisory board should be better informed, become more active, and exercise its 
counselling and supervisory functions more effectively.  The recommendations of the 
Government Commission – which serve as the basis for the Code of Best Practices and the 
Law for the Further Reform of Corporation Law, Accounting Law, and of Transparency 
and Publicity – seek to contribute to reaching this goal.  In practice, this means an 
improved flow of information from the management board and broader supervisory 
powers, more frequent meetings and better preparation for each meeting, supervisory 
board members with higher qualifications, increased independence, and more international 
background and experience, more work for the supervisory board, stricter confidentialitiy 
requirements and liability provisions ( and better pay, which may of course be 
performance-linked).  In addition, the supervisory board should in the future examine the 
efficiency of its own performance. 
3.  The Shareholders' Meeting 
The recommendations of the Government Commission regarding the shareholders' 
meeting, and communication between the company and its shareholders in general, aim 
toward promoting the broadest possible use of modern information and communication 
technologies, including interactive webcasts of shareholders' meetings (a webcast of the 
meeting with online shareholder voting).  Competition for proxies should be increased. 
The Government Commission recommends transforming the various, paper-based 
archives of information on companies (the Commercial Register (Handelsregister), the 
Official Gazette (Bundesanzeiger), the regulatory files of interim reports 
(Zwischenberichte), current reports (Ad-hoc Mitteilungen), and changes in major equity 
holdings in listed companies, and prospectuses) into electronic form, and creating a 
centralized internet portal through which such information can be retrieved (a "German 
Business Register"). 
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4.  Accounting and Auditors 
The Government Commission also made a number of recommendations regarding 
accounting and auditors.  Permit me to mention two such recommendations here.  The first 
of these concerns the enforcement of accounting standards.  It was felt that there was a gap 
in German regulation in this respect.  The Commission proposed to adopt an enforcement 
system similar to the British model (enforcement by the Financial Reporting Review 
Panel) rather than the U.S. approach (enforcement by a government agency).  The second 
recommendation goes to the independence of auditors.  German law already contains a 
number of provisions designed to counteract typical conflicts of interest. The Government 
Commission held the opinion that these requirements should be strengthened through 
disclosure requirements. 
In the future, before the supervisory board proposes an auditing firm to the 
shareholders' meeting for appointment, it must examine the auditing firm's independence 
and consider any doubts that may arise concerning such independence.  For this purpose, 
the supervisory board must have the proposed auditing firm submit a declaration 
disclosing all professional, financial, and other relationships it has with the company and 
its management and supervisory bodies; this includes, in particular, consulting 
assignments during the preceding fiscal year and the compensation received for such 
assignments.  In addition, the auditing firm must promptly inform the chairman of the 
supervisory board or the audit committee of any grounds for potential conflicts of interest 
or partiality arise during the performance of the audit. 
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Foreword 
 
The institutionalization and internationalization of shareholdings, the globalization 
of capital markets and the rapid development of information technologies have placed our 
corporate law system under increasing pressure to adapt to the ever changing requirements 
of the market. For this reason, in May 2000, the German government called together a 
group of industrialists, representatives of shareholder associations and institutional 
investors, trade unionists, politicians and scholars to form an expert Panel with the task of 
reviewing the German corporate governance system. This “Government Panel on 
Corporate Governance“ prepared a questionnaire on key issues in the field, and solicited 
responses and input from numerous national and international experts and institutions.  
In July 2001, the Commission presented its 320 page report (available at 
www.otto-schmidt.de/corporate_governance.htm) to the German Chancellor. The Report 
made nearly 150 recommendations for amendments or changes to existing provisions of 
German law and also set forth proposals on how the German corporate governance system 
should be further developed in order to maintain a normative framework that is suitable 
and attractive not only for companies, but also for domestic and foreign investors.  In 
order that the Panel’s proposals may receive careful consideration from a diverse 
audience, it seems very useful to keep a wider public informed of the Panel’s 
recommendations. Therefore, also on behalf of the Panel, I very much appreciate that the 
international law firm Shearman & Sterling has taken the initiative to have the summary of 
the Panel’s recommendations translated into English. 
 
 
 
 Theodor  Baums 
  Chairman, Government Panel for Corporate Governance 
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German Government to Reform Company Law 
and Strengthen Germany's Financial Market 
 
The following statement was given by the State Minister to the Chancellery, Mr. Hans 
Martin Bury, when the Chairman of the Government Panel on Corporate Governance, 
Prof. Dr. Theodor Baums, delivered the Panel’s report to the German Chancellor. 
 
The work of the Government Panel on Corporate Governance has laid the foundation for a 
comprehensive reform of German company law.  The Panel's recommendations aim to 
improve corporate management and supervision, transparency and competition.  They 
improve the protection of stockholders and strengthen Germany's financial market.  The 
Government Panel not only has accomplished its mission of formulating recommendations 
to correct undesirable past trends, but has also developed proposals with well-reasoned 
future orientation to strengthen the German system of Corporate Governance and 
eliminate potential shortcomings. 
 
To better protect investors, the Panel recommends extending the civil liability of 
management and supervisory board members of publicly listed companies from its current 
standard of “willful intent” to also include “gross negligence” in connection with the 
release of false information to the capital market.  Quarterly reports should be mandatory 
for all publicly listed companies and audits by certified public accountants should be 
required.  In addition, the Government Panel recommends measures to improve the 
independence of auditors. 
 
The federal government will immediately act on the Panel's central proposal by appointing 
a group of experts to draft and continuously improve a Code of Corporate Governance, as 
well as by creating the legal framework for this new, flexible instrument.  In accordance 
with the principle of "comply or explain" which the Panel recommends, the Code itself 
will not be fixed in law.  It would only be required that publicly listed companies state in 
their annual reports whether they observe the Code of Corporate Governance or, in the 
alternative, set forth the reasons why they do not follow its recommendations.  The 
financial markets will value this innovative element internationally, and this will further 
improve the financing conditions obtained by German companies. 
 
The Government Panel expects that the Code will, among other things, define goals for 
improving the performance of supervisory boards.  This includes, for example, restricting 
to five per person the number of external supervisory board positions that a supervisory 
board member may hold, strengthening the independence of supervisory board members, 
and the recommendation that supervisory board members should not be permitted to fill 
positions that are in competition with the company.  Further, the Code should contain 
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expanded transparency standards, such as for management stock option plans and for the 
shareholdings of members of the reporting company's management and supervisory 
boards, as well as increase the duties of the management board to provide information to 
stockholders. 
 
In addition, the federal government will immediately begin drafting a "Transparency and 
Disclosure Act" in which further proposals of the Government Panel will be implemented.  
These will include the legal foundation for the "comply or explain" principle, measures to 
strengthen supervisory boards, such as through broader disclosure duties for the 
management board and tighter confidentiality requirements for supervisory board 
members, the use of electronic media for company publications and deregulation in 
corporation law, such as through a further reduction of the minimum par value of stock. 
 
In a further stage, the Panel's recommendations will serve as the foundation for a 
comprehensive reform of corporation law and accounting regulations. 
 
The federal government thanks the Government Panel for its excellent work.  Thanks go 
especially to the Chairman, Prof. Dr. Theodor Baums, and also to the Panel members from 
the business sector, unions, stockholder associations, academia and politics who achieved 
a broad consent to the reform of company law through their intensive consultations.  The 
federal government will forward the Panel's final report to the German Bundestag, the 
parliament's lower house.  
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Summary of Recommendations 
 
 
  Marginal Note 
Number 
First Chapter: Regulation by Statute vs. Code of Corporate Governance 
 
  
The Government Panel recommends a German Code of Corporate Governance. ...  5 - 7 
The rules of such a Code would supplement statutory law, and they should not be 
binding in substance but should have the character of recommendations. However, 
it should be made mandatory to state whether the rules of the Code are being 
observed ("comply or explain"). . ............................................................................. 
 
 
 
8 
The Government Panel proposes that management and supervisory boards of 
publicly listed companies state on an annual basis that they observe the 
recommendations of a Code of Corporate Governance published in the German 
Federal Gazette (Bundesanzeiger) ("statement of compliance"). The statement of 
compliance must include reasons for any deviations from the recommendations of 
the Code of Corporate Governance. ......................................................................... 
 
 
 
 
 
9 - 12 
The applicability of a Code of Corporate Governance should be restricted to 
publicly listed companies. Privately held companies are free to adopt the 
supplemental rules of a Code in their articles of association, rules of procedure or 
employment contracts; this may be of particular interest to companies planning on 
going public. ............................................................................................................. 
 
 
 
 
13 - 15 
The Government Panel recommends that the federal government assign a 
Committee the task of drafting a Code of Corporate Governance for German 
publicly listed companies. The Committee should comprise a maximum of twelve 
members who should have recognized qualifications and appropriate expertise; in 
particular, individual members should have experience and knowledge with 
respect to the corporate governance of domestic and foreign publicly listed 
companies, as well as in the fields of company law, accounting and auditing. 
Institutional and private investors, employee representatives, management and 
supervisory board members, management consultants in relevant fields and 
academics should be appointed to the Committee. .................................................. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 - 17 
The Code drafted by this Committee should be published in the Federal Gazette. 
The Committee should reconvene at appropriate intervals in order to discuss 
whether the Code needs to be updated or amended. ................................................ 
 
 
17 
  
 
Second Chapter: Management and Supervisory Boards 
 
 
The Government Panel recommends that the included corporations that draw up 
consolidated financial statements or partial group financial statements, or that 
consolidate other companies on a pro rata basis pursuant to § 310 of the German 
Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch – HGB) be required by law to include 
those subsidiaries in their regular reporting provided for in § 90(1), sentence 1, of 
the Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz – AktG). .................................................. 
 
 
 
 
 
21 
The Government Panel proposes that legal provisions be enacted to extend the 
supervisory board's right of inspection and review pursuant to § 111(2) AktG as 
follows: an expert appointed by the supervisory board and subject to a duty of 
professional confidentiality should have power to exercise the rights under 
§  111(2), sentence  1 AktG, including towards affiliated companies within the 
meaning of § 290(2) HGB and other companies within the meaning of § 310 HGB. 
The expert should have power to demand explanations and evidence from the legal 
representatives of the respective subsidiaries. .......................................................... 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22 
The Government Panel proposes that, in § 90(1) AktG, it be made clear that the 
management board must, in its reports on the intended business policy and other 
principal issues of corporate planning, disclose any deviation from previously set 
targets, and provide reasons for such deviation.  ...................................................... 
 
 
 
24 
The Government Panel recommends to stipulate in § 90 AktG that the reports 
pursuant to § 90(1), sentence 1, (3) must as a rule be made in writing. ................... 
 
25 
The Government Panel recommends to provide in § 90 AktG that, as a rule, the 
management board's reports must be submitted to the supervisory board members 
in a timely fashion. ................................................................................................... 
 
 
27 
The Government Panel recommends to delete the requirement stipulated in 
§§  90(3), sentence 2, and 110(2) AktG that an additional supervisory board 
member has to second a request for a report or convocation. .................................. 
 
 
30 - 31 
The Government Panel recommends to replace the term "Aushändigen" (literally 
"handing over") by the term "Übermittlung" (literally "transmission") in all cases 
where law currently requires "handing over" of documents to supervisory board 
members, pursuant to, for example, §§ 90(5), 170(3) and 314 Akt. ........................ 
 
 
 
32 
The Government Panel recommends that the federal government observe the 
implementation of risk management systems pursuant to § 91(2) AktG and their 
review pursuant to § 317(4) HGB, and, on the basis of its findings, consider 
whether the duty of risk management pursuant to § 91(2) AktG should be extended 
to companies having other legal structures. ............................................................. 
 
 
 
 
 
33 
- 16 -  
The Government Panel recommends amending § 111(4), sentence 2 AktG and 
inserting the following new sentence 3: "However, the articles of association or the 
supervisory board should specify that certain types of transactions may be entered 
into only with the consent of the supervisory board. These shall include decisions 
or measures to be taken by the company or its subsidiaries that fundamentally 
change the projects for profit or risk exposure of the company." ............................  
 
 
 
 
 
34 - 35 
The Government Panel recommends that § 86 AktG be deleted and not be 
replaced. ..  
 
 
41 
The Government Panel recommends supplementing the explanatory list for the 
concept "total remuneration of individual management board members" under 
§ 87(1), sentence 1 AktG ("salary, profit-sharing, expense allowances, insurance 
premiums, commissions and fringe benefits of all kinds") by making reference to 
stock-based or incentive-based remuneration commitments.  .................................. 
 
 
 
 
 
44 
The Government Panel recommends that, in the Code of Corporate Governance 
for publicly listed companies, the management board be required  to present a 
report to the shareholders’ meeting on any creation of contingent capital or 
authorization to repurchase own stock for the purpose of servicing stock options 
for management board members or employees. This report should contain all 
information required for a proper evaluation of the plan, in particular, details 
regarding the value or value spread of the option. ................................................... 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45 
The Government Panel is in favor of including a recommendation in the Code of 
Corporate Governance that would prohibit a person who serves on the supervisory 
boards of five other non-affiliated companies from becoming a supervisory board 
member of a publicly listed company. ..................................................................... 
 
 
 
52 
   
It is recommended that the Committee to be established for the drafting of a Code 
of Corporate Governance provide in the Code that supervisory board members 
may not hold office in or represent other companies that are in competition with 
the company in which they serve on the supervisory board.  ................................... 
 
 
 
54 
   
It is recommended that the Committee to be established for the drafting of a Code 
of Corporate Governance consider the issue of the independence of supervisory 
board members when formulating the Code; this also includes the problem of 
management board members switching to the supervisory board.  .......................... 
 
 
 
55 
   
The dissemination of information about the work of the supervisory board 
committees to the entire supervisory board should be improved by a revised 
§ 107(3), sentence 3 AktG, providing that the supervisory board should receive 
regular reports on the committees' work. ................................................................. 
 
 
 
56 
The Government Panel recommends to provide in § 110(3) AktG that, as a matter 
of principle, the supervisory boards of all companies must convene at least twice 
in each calendar semester. Privately held companies should be able to provide 
otherwise with the consent of all supervisory board members. Physical presence of 
the supervisory board members should not be required in all individual cases; 
telephone or video conferences or respective add-on connections should be 
possible (as an exception when justified). ................................................................ 
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The Government Panel recommends to delete § 10(4) of the German Corporation 
Tax Act (Körperschaftsteuergesetz). ........................................................................ 
 
65 
   
The Government Panel recommends that the Committee to be established to draft 
a Code of Corporate Governance may in such Code address the issue of how 
supervisory board members are to treat company secrets and confidential data, in 
particular with regard to the employees involved (back office), and in dealings 
with the press. ........................................................................................................... 
 
 
 
 
66 
The Government Panel endorses an increase in the range of punishment provided 
for in § 404 AktG "Violation of the Duty of Confidentiality" in subsection 1 up to 
two years, and in subsection 2 up to three years. ..................................................... 
 
 
 
67 
The Government Panel recommends to clarify in § 93 AktG that members of the 
management and supervisory boards are not liable towards the company for the 
success of their actions ("business judgment rule"). ................................................ 
 
 
70 
   
The Government Panel recommends to revise the right to commence derivative 
suits pursuant to § 147 AktG under consideration of the following key issues: 
 
   
 The right to initiate legal action should not be designed as an individual 
right to file proceedings, but as a minority right. Holdings of one per cent 
of the capital stock or stock with an exchange or market value of 100,000 
euro should be sufficient. 
 
 Procedure to admit legal action:   
  For purposes of avoiding unnecessary, unfounded or harassment actions, 
institution of proceedings should be made dependent upon a particular 
admission procedure by the trial court. Prerequisites for such admission of 
proceedings should be: 
 
  -  sufficient prospects of success, to wit: the availability of facts 
substantiating any suspected dishonesty or other gross violations of law 
or the articles of association by relevant members of the management 
and supervisory boards; 
 
  -  an unsuccessful request to the company to itself initiate legal action, 
and the absence of preponderant reasons on the company's side 
speaking against the enforcement of the compensation claim; 
 
  -  achievement of a quorum by the petitioners and evidence that they 
purchased their shares prior to learning about the violations of a duty 
that entails liability; 
 
  -  should the application to admit the action prove to be unsuccessful, the 
petitioners should bear the court fees and costs incurred by the 
defendants. 
 
 Proceedings for actions seeking compensatory damages   
  If the trial court admits the claim, the following procedural principles 
should apply to proceedings for compensatory damages: 
 
  -    the authorized plaintiff should be the petitioner of the successful 
admission procedure; 
 
  -  the special representative that was previously required to be appointed 
by the trial court (§ 147(3) AktG) is to eliminated; 
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  -  proceedings should be initiated against the relevant members of the 
management and supervisory boards and seek compensatory damages 
on behalf of the company; there should be no "bonus" payment to the 
plaintiffs; 
 
  -  the action should be initiated within a proper period of time;   
  -  the remaining stockholders should be given notice of the intention to 
initiate proceedings by advance announcement in the business 
newspapers, so that they have an opportunity to participate; 
 
  -  the legal effect of the verdict should extend to the corporation and  to 
the remaining stockholders, even if the action is dismissed; 
 
-  the effectiveness of a settlement should be dependent upon the consent 
of the trial court; in this context, § 93(4) AktG should not apply; 
 
  -  the decision regarding the costs of the case should be made in line with 
§ 91 of the German Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung – 
ZPO). However, given that the stockholders who are successful in a 
procedure to admit a legal action would have to bear the costs as a 
consequence of the action's dismissal, they should have been granted a 
claim to reimbursement of expenses from the corporation. However, 
costs which were caused by the plaintiffs' improper prosecution of the 
case should be excluded from such claim; 
 
  -  the minority right stipulated in § 147(1) AktG should be deleted, and 
§ 147(2) AktG should be adjusted. ......................................................... 
 
72 - 73 
The Government Panel recommends that, by amending §§ 289, 314 HGB the 
amount paid for any directors and officers ("D&O") insurance plan for 
management and supervisory board members, and the amount of the respective 
payment by each member be disclosed in the Notes to the individual or 
consolidated financial statements. ............................................................................ 
 
 
 
 
75 
 
Third Chapter: Stockholders and Investors 
 
 
Companies should be able to publish invitations to the shareholders’ meeting 
either in writing by publication in the Federal Gazette or in an online version of 
the Federal Gazette. .................................................................................................. 
 
 
83 
   
Recommendation is made to the Committee for drafting a Code of Corporate 
Governance that it specify in such Code that the dates of the shareholders’ 
meetings may be published otherwise than as provided for in § 121(3) and (4) 
AktG, for example, by means of a financial calendar, which should also be placed 
on the company's website. ........................................................................................ 
 
 
 
 
84 
   
In addition, the Government Panel recommends that the Committee to be 
established for drafting a Code of Corporate Governance for publicly listed 
companies adopt a rule that the company provide all financial service providers 
and stockholders that have so requested within a specified period of not more than 
one year, with invitations to shareholders’ meetings, including all pertinent 
documents, electronically upon the latter's request. ................................................. 
 
 
 
 
 
86 
The Government Panel proposes that the information provided to German   
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investors on foreign companies listed on German stock markets be improved. 
Once the unified electronic access portal (the "German Company Register") has 
been installed, the previously used newspaper publication (for calls to meetings) 
should be replaced by electronic publications. Foreign issuers who are listed on 
German stock markets should be required to provide the data required for 
stockholder communication to the stock market or the Federal Gazette 
electronically. ........................................................................................................... 
 
 
 
 
 
 
88 
   
It is recommended that the Committee to be established for drafting a Code of 
Corporate Governance for publicly listed companies adopt a rule in the Code 
requiring that reports and documentation that are to be presented for the 
stockholders' perusal from the date the shareholders’ meeting is called also be 
placed on the company's website. The Code Committee should also make this 
requirement apply to business reports that companies distribute voluntarily. ......... 
 
 
 
 
 
97 
   
The Government Panel proposes that the announcement of counter motions by 
stockholders (§ 126 AktG), including the management's positions thereon, no 
longer be made pursuant to § 125 AktG, but should simply be made available in a 
generally accessible form, such as on the company's website, and only if the 
motion was sent to an address made known to the stockholders in the call to the 
shareholders’ meeting.  ............................................................................................. 
 
 
 
 
 
100 - 102 
The Government Panel is in favor of eliminating the requirement that shares be 
deposited as a prerequisite for participating in or voting at the shareholders’ 
meeting. Instead, the articles of association should provide for stockholders to 
prove their status as holders by presenting or electronically submitting a certificate 
issued by an institution (e.g., a bank or notary public) specified in the articles of 
association. If the articles of association provide for registration or presentation of 
proof, it should suffice if evidence of status as holder is provided as of the seventh 
day preceding the shareholders’ meeting. ................................................................ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
104 
   
Section 131 AktG should be expanded to allow the management board to refuse a 
request to provide information that is available on the company website up to the 
end of the shareholders’ meeting and, at the same time, has been made available in 
written form at the shareholders’ meeting. ............................................................... 
 
 
 
105 
The Government Panel recommends that it should be possible to limit, in the 
articles of association or in procedural rules (§ 129 AktG), the number of questions 
that stockholders may ask during the shareholders’ meeting.  In this case, at least 
five questions must be admitted per stockholder and agenda item. The articles of 
association or procedural rules should further provide that stockholders who intend 
to ask more than five questions regarding one agenda item must submit them to the 
company up to five days before the shareholders’ meeting. .................................... 
 
 
 
 
 
 
106 
The Government Panel proposes to permit, on the basis of a provision in the 
articles of association, tele-transmission of verbal contributions during the 
shareholders’ meeting, to include visual transmission of the person, including 
without the consent of the stockholder concerned. .................................................. 
 
 
 
109 
   
The Government Panel proposes that it should be possible to hold a shareholders’ 
meeting with all shares present or represented (§ 121(6) AktG) as a mere 
 
 
- 20 -  
shareholders’ meeting by internet. Resolutions requiring documentary 
certification, however, should not be adopted during such meetings.  ..................... 
 
111 
   
The Government Panel is of the opinion that the articles of association or the 
procedural rules should define appropriate limitations on the timeframe for 
exercising the right to speak and obtain information, as well as restrictions on the 
list of speakers. ......................................................................................................... 
 
 
 
113 
   
The company's articles of association should be able to provide for stockholders to 
participate directly in the shareholders’ meeting without either being themselves 
present or using a proxy, and to exercise all or certain rights by means of 
electronic communication. ....................................................................................... 
 
 
 
115 - 120 
As in the similar case of § 135(1), sentence 2 AktG, the Government Panel 
recommends to clarify in § 134(3) AktG that voting by a company-appointed 
proxy should be permitted only if the proxy is given express instructions. ............. 
 
 
122 
   
The Government Panel further recommends that the Code of Corporate 
Governance require companies either to place electronic links on their website to 
those proxy voters who exercised voting rights for stockholders during the last 
shareholders’ meeting or, alternatively, to integrate the proxy's voting proposals 
directly into the company's own on-screen form.  .................................................... 
 
 
 
 
123 
   
In the opinion of the Government Panel, the articles of association should in the 
future allow members of the supervisory board, in well-founded exceptional cases, 
to participate in shareholders’ meetings by any effective means of electronic, 
telephonic or video communication. ........................................................................ 
 
 
 
125 
The Government Panel supports extending § 10(1), sentence 4 of the Investment 
Company Act so that investment companies may authorize independent parties to 
vote by proxy on a permanent basis rather than just in specific cases. .................... 
 
 
128 
   
The Government Panel recommends facilitating communication between 
stockholders in cases where the law requires a certain minimum shareholding or 
minimum amount of voting rights for the exercise of stockholder rights. The 
company's website offers a good medium for this. Management should be 
permitted to refuse any publication on the grounds specified in § 126(2), sentence 
1, nos. 1-3, and sentence 2 AktG, or if a request has already been made based on 
the same facts. The stockholder must advance the publication costs, which the 
company must reimburse if the minority petition is approved. ................................ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
131 
   
The Government Panel suggests reviewing whether it should be made possible for 
privately held companies to provide expanded stockholder rights in their articles of 
association, with particular reference to creating rights of stockholders to inspect 
records and obtain information.  ............................................................................... 
 
 
 
132 
The Government Panel suggests that the federal government examine how to make 
it clear that an action for rescission based on allegations of insufficient information 
regarding valuation is excluded in all cases when the challenge to valuation is 
referred to declaratory proceedings, in particular, in cases of mergers. ………....... 
 
 
 
134 
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The Government Panel recommends that a minimum shareholding be required to 
commence an action for rescission of a shareholders' resolution based upon a 
violation of a duty to provide information (reporting or disclosure duties). The 
claimant in an action for rescission or, in the case of a class action, the claimants 
must either own shares constituting one per cent of the capital stock, or having an 
exchange or market value of 100,000 euro. The judicial procedure for enforcing 
disclosure (§ 132 AktG) should be extended to violations of other obligations to 
disclose (such as reporting duties).  .......................................................................... 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
139 
The Government Panel supports specifying in the Stock Corporation Act that a 
shareholders' resolution may only be rescinded on the basis of incorrect, 
incomplete or denied information if the material significance of the information 
leads to the assumption that the disclosure of correct and complete information 
would have influenced the behavior of a reasonable shareholder. ........................... 
 
 
 
 
140 
   
The Government Panel suggests to adopt the following rule in the Code of 
Corporate Governance: "Stockholders shall receive access to any and all 
information that is provided to financial analysts and similar persons. The 
company shall also use communication media like the Internet to provide current 
and consistent information to stockholders and investors." ..................................... 
 
 
 
 
143 
   
The Government Panel is of the opinion that the right to special audit (§ 142 et 
seq. AktG) requires a revision. ................................................................................. 
 
144 
The Government Panel suggests that the exclusion of an action for rescission   
pursuant to § 14(2) German Reorganization Act (Umwandlungsgesetz – UmwG) 
also be extended to the accepting company, that § 15(1) UmwG be adjusted 
accordingly, and that a declaratory proceeding instead be established for this 
purpose.   ................................................................................................................. 
 
 
 
 
151 
   
The Government Panel suggests to provide for a formal freeze on registration 
following the example given in § 16(2) UmwG when an action for rescission 
against a capital increase or decrease is filed (in the case of both publicly listed and 
privately held companies) and against other corporate actions requiring 
registration, except for simple amendments to the articles of association and 
declarative entries, and, moreover, for a curative effect of the register entry in such 
cases in line with § 20(2) UmwG. In addition, it is recommended that a release 
procedure before the trial court be introduced in these matters following the 
example of § 16(3) UmwG. ...................................................................................... 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
153 
   
The Government Panel suggests that a legal deadline of three months for the 
release decision be set from the date the motion was received, with the possibility 
for a court to extend it for good cause (schwerwiegender Grund). Such cause must 
be set forth in the extension decision. The same should apply for decisions made 
by the appeals court. ................................................................................................. 
 
 
 
 
155 
The Government Panel recommends that for resolutions that require registration, 
and for which an action for rescission does not trigger a legal freeze on 
registration, an entry release proceeding before the trial court similar to the model 
of § 16(3) UmwG should be introduced after the entry procedure pursuant to § 127 
of the Act Regulating Jurisdiction over Non-Contentions Matters (Gesetz über die 
 
 
 
 
 
- 22 -  
Angelegenheiten der freiwilligen Gerichtsbarkeit – FGG) has been suspended.   
The company should be the petitioner in that proceeding.  The decision on the 
release should, as de lege ferenda in cases of release proceedings under the 
UmwG, generally be made within three months from the date the petition was 
received. ................................................................................................................... 
 
 
 
 
157 
   
The Government Panel recommends that the parties to judicial and out-of-court 
settlements of actions for rescission be required to publish the agreements made 
(publication in the Federal Gazette). In addition, the management board should 
report on the issue at the shareholders’ meeting. ..................................................... 
 
 
 
158 - 159 
   
The Government Panel recommends that arbitration clauses in conformity with  
the articles of association of stock corporations be permitted for resolving   
actions challenging resolutions. This rule should be restricted to privately held 
companies. ................................................................................................................ 
 
 
 
161 
The Government Panel recommends allowing and suggesting to the federal states 
(Länder) to give one district court (Landgericht) exclusive jurisdiction for the 
entire state territory to handle all corporation law actions challenging shareholders' 
resolutions. ............................................................................................................... 
 
 
 
163 
   
The Government Panel recommends that the exemption from liability for 
intentional infliction of damage through the exercise of voting rights, as covered 
by § 117(7) no. 1 AktG, be repealed. ....................................................................... 
 
 
164 
   
In order to address the concern of stockholders of a parent company who may be 
exposed to the risk of value impairment (watering) of their shares when one of the 
parents' subsidiaries or sub-subsidiaries makes an initial public offering, the 
Committee to be established for drafting a Code of Corporate Governance is 
recommended to highlight this risk and emphasize that the management board is 
responsible, on the basis of its duty of care and duty of loyalty, for confronting this 
risk by either granting the stockholders preemptive rights to the offering or 
pursuing proper pricing procedures in line with market practice. ............................ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
165 
The Government Panel supports the position that, in cases that may entail a 
declaratory proceeding, any expert auditor who is to review a settlement or 
compensation payment should be selected and appointed by the court that would 
have to render the decision in the declaratory proceeding. ...................................... 
 
 
 
170 
   
The reform of declaratory proceedings should involve raising a petitioners' duty to 
substantiate the claim. Concrete reasons have to be set forth to demonstrate which 
aspects of the pretrial expert assessment require a review. ...................................... 
 
 
171 
   
The expert assigned by the court for a declaratory proceeding should have a claim 
to adequate remuneration against the company; expenditures and remuneration are 
to be established by the court. .................................................................................. 
 
 
172 
   
The Government Panel recommends allowing and suggesting to the federal states 
to give one district court exclusive jurisdiction for the entire state territory to 
handle all declaratory proceedings. ..........................................................................  
 
 
173 
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The Government Panel recommends that the appeal of a district court decision in a 
declaratory proceeding be restricted to violations of law.  ....................................... 
 
174 
   
The Government Panel suggests that the petitioners in a declaratory proceeding be 
required to bear all out-of-court expenditures if the claim is not successful.  ..........  
 
175 
   
The Government Panel suggests that reports on controlled status and the related 
audit reports be disclosed when a subsidiary becomes insolvent. This duty to 
disclose should extend back to the reports on controlled status and audit reports for 
the last five years prior to insolvency. The controlling company should be given 
the opportunity to comment before disclosing the reports. Upon petition by the 
controlling company, the insolvency court should restrict or prohibit the disclosure 
if this is justified by legitimate interests of the controlling company, such as the 
protection of business secrets. .................................................................................. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
180 
   
Legislation should provide that the members of the management and supervisory 
boards of publicly listed companies will incur civil liability for releasing false 
information about the state of the company intentionally or in a grossly negligent 
manner. ..................................................................................................................... 
 
 
 
186 - 187 
The Government Panel recommends to provide for common representation of 
damaged investors in the case that false information is released intentionally or in 
a grossly negligent manner. Any obligation to join such a collective representation 
should be excluded, as should be any commercialization of the claim by multiple 
representations or contingency fee. .......................................................................... 
 
 
 
 
 
188 - 190 
Fourth Chapter:  Corporate Finance 
 
  
I.   Deregulation   
The Government Panel recommends amending § 8 of the Stock Corporation Act 
on the minimum par value of shares so that, in the future, par value shares may 
have a par value of (at the least) one euro cent, and that the pro rata amount of the 
capital stock allotted to one share without par value may not be less than one euro 
cent. ……….............................................................................................................. 
 
 
 
 
192 
   
By amendment of the articles of association with the necessary majority of votes, 
the shareholders’ meeting should be able to authorize the management board, for a 
maximum period of five years and with the consent of the supervisory board, to 
amend the provisions of the articles of association regarding the allocation of the 
capital stock (par value and number of shares). ....................................................... 
 
 
 
 
193 
   
The Government Panel recommends deleting the prohibition on company split-ups 
set forth in § 141 of the Reorganization Act. ........................................................... 
 
196 
   
The Government Panel suggests deleting § 58(2), 2
nd half of sentence 2 AktG and 
thus affording publicly listed companies the possibility freely to provide in their 
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articles of association for greater discretion in creating reserves..............................  197 
The Government Panel suggests amending the rules on distribution of § 58 AktG 
so that the articles of association may permit the shareholders’ meeting to 
distribute dividends not only in cash, but also in kind. ............................................ 
 
 
200 
   
The Government Panel recommends that interim dividends be permitted. .............  201 
   
The Government Panel recommends to amend § 71(1), no. 2 AktG as follows:  a 
company may acquire its own shares without being authorized by the 
shareholders’ meeting if the shares are to be offered to persons in the present or 
past employ of the company or an affiliate, or to persons who are exclusively 
engaged in serving the company as sales representatives. ....................................... 
 
 
 
 
204 
   
In the opinion of the Government Panel, provision should be made in law to allow 
a company to acquire its own shares without authorization by the shareholders’ 
meeting for the purpose of compensating stockholders of the company or of its 
subsidiaries. .............................................................................................................. 
 
 
 
205 
Section 71(1) no. 3 AktG should further provide that a company's acquisition of its 
own shares without authorization by the shareholders’ meeting for compensatory 
purposes is permitted only in cases where the duty to make payment rests on a 
shareholders resolution, or is attributable to such a resolution. ............................... 
 
 
 
205 
   
The Government Panel proposes that use should be made of the authorization 
granted by § 24a (4a) of the Second Company Law Directive of the European 
Council for the repurchase of shares of a parent by its subsidiaries only if such 
subsidiaries are supervised financial service providers. ........................................... 
 
 
 
206 
   
The Goverment Panel recommends that use should be made of the authorization 
granted by § 24a (4b) of the Second Company Law Directive but it should be 
specified in § 71d AktG that a shareholders' resolution of the company that holds a 
majority of the company's shares or controls the company is required.  .................. 
 
 
 
207 
The Government Panel supports creating an exception to the limitation on the 
admissible purpose of acquisition in § 71(1), no. 8, sentence 2 AktG for publicly 
supervised financial service providers, thereby permitting them to acquire their 
own shares under § 71(1), no. 8 AktG for the purpose of asset management in 
respect of its own shares and those of its parent company. ...................................... 
 
 
 
 
208 
   
The Government Panel recommends that it be made clear in § 71e AktG that a 
dependent credit institution may accept shares of its parent company as pledged 
collateral under the conditions stated therein. .......................................................... 
 
 
211 
   
The Government Panel advocates that § 204(1) sentence 1 AktG be amended to 
allow the management board to decide on the type of shares (bearer or registered 
shares) to be issued when new shares are being issued from authorized capital. .... 
 
 
214 
The Government Panel recommends amending § 185(1) sentence 3, no. 2 AktG, 
which requires that the final issue price has to be determined as early as when the 
new shares are subscribed to, even in the case of a capital increase against a 
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contribution in kind.  In the case of a capital increase against a contribution in 
kind, it should suffice at the time of subscription to determine either the issue price 
or a minimum issue price, and the basis on which the final issue price will be 
established. ............................................................................................................... 
 
 
 
217 
   
Section 186(2) AktG should be amended as follows: in the notice of opportunity to 
exercise a preemptive right, the management board may limit itself to stating the 
basis on which the final issue price is to be calculated.  In this case, the final issue 
price has to be published prior to the expiration of the subscription period, 
providing adequate time so that the preemptive right may still be exercised.  This 
shall be referred to in the notice of opportunity to exercise the preemptive right 
and reference must be made to the time and location of the publication and the 
final issue price. ........................................................................................................ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
218 
   
The Government Panel recommends that it be made possible to exclude 
preemptive rights analogue to § 186(3) sentence 4 AktG for issues of convertible 
bonds (including warrant issues) if the par value or pro rata amount of the shares 
to be granted when exercising the conversion or subscription rights does not 
exceed ten per cent of the capital stock existing at the time of the shareholders 
resolution, and the issue price does not significantly fall below the market value of 
the bond as established by recognized methods, provided the bond is actually 
placed on the market.  ............................................................................................... 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
221 
The Government Panel suggests that it also be possible to effect contingent capital 
increases in the future for the execution of mergers of undertakings, acquisitions of 
undertakings, or other purposes. If the subscription of shares is made dependent 
upon the achieving of certain targets, the prerequisites for these (targets, exercise 
periods) should be determined in the resolution raising the contingent capital. ...... 
 
 
 
 
223 - 224 
   
The Government Panel recommends that the provision of § 193(2), no. 4 AktG 
should apply to all option rights granted for remunerating purposes. ...................... 
 
226 
The Government Panel supports an expansion of the duty provided for in §§ 202 et 
seq. AktG requiring the management board to provide current (and also 
retrospective) written reports on the use of authorized capital with excluded 
stockholder preemptive rights.  The contents of the reports should be aligned to the 
requirements of § 186(4) sentence 2 AktG, and must thus state the reason for 
excluding the preemptive rights, and, in particular, provide the basis for the issue 
price of the new shares.  The management report should also be required to be 
filed with the commercial register and be published in the form specified in the 
articles of association for publications (§ 23(4) and 25 AktG). ............................... 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
230 
   
The Government Panel suggests to limit the management board's reporting duties 
on the use of authorized capital with exclusion of stockholders' preemptive rights 
as provided for in § 293a (2) AktG and § 8(2) UmwG. ........................................... 
 
 
231 
The Government Panel proposes that an intrinsic value verification be required in 
all cases in which new shares are issued to holders of more than 10 per cent of the 
company's capital stock against an in-kind contribution.  In these cases, it should 
be provided that the court-appointed auditor may be neither the certified 
accountant of the company nor that of the contributor. The findings of the intrinsic 
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value verification have to be filed with the commercial register. ............................  232 
   
The Government Panel advocates repealing § 207(3) AktG. ...................................  233 
    
The Government Panel suggests that it be permitted to redeem no par value shares 
without par value even if a reduction of capital is not effected.  .............................. 
 
234 
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II.  New Financing and Structured Instruments   
The Government Panel recommends to provide for redeemable shares also under 
the German Stock Corporation Act within the framework of and pursuant to the 
requirement of § 39 of the Second Company Law Directive. In addition, an upper 
ceiling of 50 per cent of the capital stock should be introduced according to the 
example given in § 139(2) AktG. ............................................................................. 
 
 
 
 
235 
   
The Government Panel is in favor of removing the special requirements for 
adopting resolutions for specific classes of shares pursuant to §§ 182(2), 193(1), 
sentence 3, 202(2), sentence 4, 221(1), sentence 4, 222(2), 229(3), 237(2), 
sentence 1 AktG and the corresponding provisions of the UmwG and making it 
clear that § 179(3) AktG is applicable.  .................................................................... 
 
 
 
 
241 
   
The Government Panel recommends making appropriate amendments in the Stock 
Corporation Act for tracking stock to be redeemed or converted into common 
stock at the request of the company or of the holder of the tracking stock in as 
flexible a way as possible. ........................................................................................ 
 
 
 
242 
Fifth Chapter:  Information Technology and Publicity 
 
   
The Government Panel proposes that the federal government create a unified 
electronic access portal ("German Company Register") which will give the 
business world and capital market participants access to official corporate 
information published to meet disclosure requirements (commercial register, 
relevant federal gazette announcements, database of reported shareholdings 
maintained by the Federal Supervisory Authority for Securities Trading 
(Bundesaufsichtsamt für Wertpapierhandel). .......................................................... 
 
 
 
 
 
 
252 
   
The Government Panel recommends allowing an online query system that would 
also include non-published documentation filed with the commercial register 
which may be accessed pursuant to § 9(2) HGB.  .................................................... 
 
 
253 
The Government Panel recommends repealing the restriction to print media found 
in §§ 10 and 11 HGB with respect to commercial register publications. ................. 
 
253 
   
The Government Panel recommends clarifying that companies may transmit the 
documentation to be filed with the registry court pursuant to § 325(1) HGB in 
paper copy or in an electronic form that the court can read. .................................... 
 
 
253 
   
In the opinion of the Government Panel, § 325(2) and (3) HGB should provide that 
the Federal Gazette shall transmit announcements to the registry court in paper 
copy or in an electronic form that the court can read, together with the 
accompanying documentation. ................................................................................. 
 
 
 
253 
   
The Government Panel suggests that announcements to be made in the Federal 
Gazette pursuant to §§ 10 and 325 HGB should, in the future, be made exclusively 
in electronic form. .................................................................................................... 
 
 
254 
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The Government Panel is of the opinion that, according to the example of § 121(4) 
AktG, announcements in the business newspapers should in the future no longer 
be required if a notification is exclusively addressed to the stockholders and the 
company knows the stockholders by name. In such cases, a facilitated means of 
announcement should be provided analogous to § 121(4) AktG. ............................ 
 
 
 
 
254 
   
The Government Panel recommends that access to the "voting rights data base" of 
the Federal Supervisory Authority for Securities Trading be provided via the 
German Company Register internet portal. .............................................................. 
 
 
256 
   
The Government Panel supports the draft of the German Standardizing Council 
regarding the details on stock option plans to be provided in the Notes to the 
consolidated financial statements. ............................................................................ 
 
 
257 - 258 
It is recommended that the Corporate Governance Committee to be established 
require in the Code of Best Practice that appropriate data on stock option plans of 
publicly listed companies be provided in the Notes to the consolidated and 
individual financial statements. This likewise applies to other performance-linked 
means of remuneration. The remuneration of management body members must be 
separately specified as fixed allowances, performance-linked payments and 
incentive (stock) price oriented components. It should be made clear in §§ 285 no. 
9a and 314(1), no. 6a HGB that the remuneration to be reported includes both 
stock-based remuneration commitments and the resulting profits. .......................... 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
259 
 
The Government Panel suggests that the Code of Corporate Governance for 
publicly listed companies include a requirement for the members of the 
management and supervisory boards to report on the amount of stock held in the 
reporting company, related subscription rights and derivates. This information 
should be reported in the Notes to the financial statements and the Notes to the 
consolidated financial statements, if the member of the management or supervisory 
board of the reporting company is at the same time a member of the management 
or supervisory board of an affiliated company. ........................................................ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
262 
The Government Panel recommends adopting a rule in the Code of Corporate 
Governance requiring the management board to submit a report to the supervisory 
board once annually specifying the amount by which donations exceed a limit to 
be determined by the supervisory board.  ................................................................. 
 
 
 
263 
   
The Government Panel suggests provisions be inserted into the Code of Corporate 
Governance in particular regarding disclosure duties to the management board and 
the supervisory board to prevent damages to the company and its subsidiaries 
resulting from transactions with executive officers and members of the 
management and supervisory boards, as well as with persons closely related to 
them or companies in which they have personal shareholdings.  ............................. 
 
 
 
 
 
264 
   
It should be required that remunerations or benefits paid by the company, its 
parent company or its subsidiaries to members of the supervisory board for 
personal services rendered, in particular for consultation and brokerage services, 
be disclosed in the Notes to the annual (consolidated) financial statements. ........... 
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Sixth Chapter:  Accounting and Auditing 
 
I.  Recommendations for Accounting   
The Government Panel recommends that the German government support the 
endeavours of the European Commission to implement uniform international 
accounting standards for consolidated financial statements as from 2005.  The 
results of the efforts of IASB for a harmonization of IAS and US-GAAP should be 
given priority in this regard. ..................................................................................... 
 
 
 
 
267 
   
The Government Panel proposes implementing the EU Regulation on the 
application of international accounting standards for all corporations, including 
those not oriented towards the capital market, by giving all companies required to 
prepare consolidated financial statements the option to prepare their entire 
accounting in accordance with IAS even before January 1, 2005.  .......................... 
 
 
 
 
268 
   
The Government Panel recommends that publicly listed companies (§ 3(2) AktG) 
should be required by law to draw up interim financial statements.  Companies 
required to prepare consolidated financial statements should draw up interim 
financial statements on a consolidated basis; subsidiaries included in consolidated 
financial interim statements should be freed of this obligation.  ..............................  
 
 
 
 
269 
The Government Panel recommends that quarterly reports for the first three 
quarters of the financial year be required. The legal regulation of the contents of 
quarterly reports should be restricted to a framework, which should be filled in 
according to a relevant accounting standard. ........................................................... 
 
 
 
270 
   
The Government Panel favors making it possible for interim reports to be 
submitted and published electronically, as well as to be quickly and centrally 
retrievable. ................................................................................................................ 
 
 
271 
   
Not only publicly listed companies, but all capital market oriented parent 
companies within the meaning of § 292a(1), sentence 1 HGB should be required to 
expand their Notes to the consolidated financial statements by adding a cash flow 
statement and segment reporting. ............................................................................. 
 
 
 
272 
   
The Government Panel recommends extending the audit of the risk management 
systems to be established pursuant to § 91(2) AktG through an auditor (§ 317(4) 
HGB) and the related report on such audit (§ 321(4) HGB) to all publicly listed 
companies. ................................................................................................................ 
 
 
 
273 
The Government Panel suggests having the supervisory board approve the 
consolidated financial statements in a manner similar to that set out in the rules on 
individual financial statements, with the option to leave the approval to the 
shareholders’ meeting. The supervisory board's reporting requirement pursuant to 
§ 171(2), sentences 3 and 4 AktG should be extended to the consolidated financial 
statements.. ............................................................................................................... 
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The Government Panel recommends providing for an institution supported and 
organized by the private sector, following the example of the British Financial 
Reporting Review Panel, to pursue alleged gross violations of accounting 
standards pursuant to procedural rules that such institution will develop in 
agreement with the companies concerned; the institution will, in the case of a 
refusal to comply, have power to take action pursuant to §§ 256 and 257 AktG. ... 
 
 
 
 
 
277 - 278 
   
II. Annual  Audit   
   
The Government Panel suggests that the Code of Corporate Governance should 
recommend to the supervisory boards of parent companies required to prepare 
consolidated financial statements that they ensure that, as a rule, the shareholders’ 
meetings of subsidiaries to be included in the consolidated financial statements 
appoint the same auditor (auditing firm) that audits the consolidated financial 
statements. ................................................................................................................  
 
 
 
 
 
282 - 283 
   
The Government Panel recommends making it clear in § 111(2) AktG that the 
supervisory board should also order an audit of (consolidated) financial statements 
that are prepared on a voluntary basis. ..................................................................... 
 
 
284 
   
The Government Panel advises providing for an audit review of interim reports by 
an auditor/auditing firm that generally should be the same as the auditors for the 
previous, full fiscal year. .......................................................................................... 
 
 
288 - 289 
   
The Government Panel recommends that reporting on violations of law and the 
articles of association (§ 321(1), 2
nd half of sentence 3 HGB) that are not 
accounting-related in the future be placed in a narrative separate from the audit 
report. In such narrative, the auditor shall state whether facts were revealed during 
the audit that would indicate serious violations of law, the partnership agreement, 
or the articles of association by legal representatives or employees. Section 321(5) 
HGB should apply to such narrative mutatis mutandis. ........................................... 
 
 
 
 
 
 
290 
   
The Government Panel suggests separating the reporting on the audit of the annual 
(consolidated) financial statement (§ 321 HGB) from the reporting to supervisory 
offices or authorities as based on particular requirements of law and regulations. 
The audit report pursuant to § 321 HGB should, in the future, report only the more 
significant assessments of a regulatory law nature in summary fashion. Completed 
audit reports on regulatory matters must be presented to the supervisory board; 
§ 321(5) HGB should apply mutatis mutandis. ........................................................ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
291 
   
The Government Panel suggests releasing the auditor who audited the last annual 
financial statements from his or her duty of secrecy in communications with the 
new auditor.  The same should apply to the auditor of the interim reports of the last 
fiscal year. The auditor of the consolidated financial statements should also be 
released from his or her duty of secrecy in communications with the new auditor 
of the consolidated financial statements. .................................................................. 
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The Government Panel suggests that audit reports be disclosed in the case of the 
audited company's insolvency. If the annual (consolidated) financial statements for 
the last three fiscal years prior to commencement of the insolvency procedure had 
to be, or were voluntarily audited, the auditor should be required, upon request of 
the committee of creditors, to disclose the portions of the audit report provided for 
in § 321(1), sentences 2 and 3 and (2) HGB and give explanations upon query. The 
insolvency administrator should be able to prohibit the disclosure of company and 
business secrets. The auditor's duty of secrecy, his or her right to refuse to testify, 
and the sanctions imposed for a violation of the duty of secrecy should be adjusted 
accordingly. .............................................................................................................. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
296 - 297 
   
It is advisable to point out in the Code of Corporate Governance that the 
supervisory board appoints the auditor and negotiates the agreement on fees. ....... 
 
299 
   
The Government Panel recommends setting forth in the HGB that the designated 
auditor of companies having a supervisory board, and for which an audit is 
mandatory, must provide details to the supervisory board or its audit committee 
regarding any circumstances (professional, financial, family ties to the company, 
the members of its management and supervisory boards or affiliated companies) 
that may give reasonable grounds to suspect partiality.  At any rate, until such a 
legal obligation has been introduced, precautionary measures should be taken in 
the Code of Corporate Governance to be drafted for publicly listed companies. 
Such Code should also provide that any grounds for suspecting incompatibility or 
partiality occurring during the time that the auditor is retained by the company 
must be reported promptly to the chairman of the supervisor board.  ......................  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
303 
   
The Government Panel recommends that the supervisory board, prior to its 
proposal to the shareholders’ meeting of the auditor to be appointed, provide the 
shareholders’ meeting with information regarding remuneration of the auditor and 
regarding the kind of auditing and non-auditing services performed by the auditor 
during the preceding fiscal year. In addition, the auditor should be required to 
inform the supervisory board of additional non-audit assignments he or she may 
receive from the management board while the audit is being performed. In 
addition, provision should also be made for the supervisory board to report to the 
shareholders’ meeting within the scope of its reporting duties pursuant to § 171(2) 
AktG on the ratio of remuneration paid to the auditor for auditing and non-auditing 
services, and to state whether, in the opinion of the supervisory board, the auditor's 
independence may be in doubt. ................................................................................ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
307 - 308 
   
III.  Supervisory Board and Annual Audit   
   
The Government Panel suggests incorporating the following recommendation into 
the Code of Corporate Governance:  "When proposing to the shareholders’ 
meeting persons to be elected to the supervisory board, the supervisory board 
members representing the stockholders shall make sure that the members of the 
supervisory board have the skills, knowledge and professional experience 
necessary for the proper performance of the tasks of the supervisory board. "........ 
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The Committee to be established for drafting a Code of Corporate Governance is 
recommended to incorporate the following into that Code as a best practice for 
supervisory boards: the supervisory board or audit committee shall require that, 
before an auditor's report is issued, the members of the audit committee or certain 
supervisory board members elected by stockholders and employees shall be 
provided draft copies of the annual (consolidated) financial statements, the 
(consolidated) report on the state of the company, and a business report for their 
brief review and comment. ....................................................................................... 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
318 
   
 
 
The Government Panel recommends that the following be set forth in the Code of 
Corporate Governance: the supervisory board shall ensure by appropriate wording 
in the auditor's letter of engagement and through consultation with the auditor, 
that, beyond the items that must be reported pursuant to § 321 HGB, the 
supervisory board will be informed of all assessments and occurrences that may be 
revealed during the audit and are significant for the performance of the tasks of the 
supervisory board (for example, defects in organization). The auditor should be 
questioned about any disagreements with the management board regarding the 
balance sheet and valuation. ..................................................................................... 
 
 
 
 
 
 
324 
   
The Government Panel suggests to provide for a duty of the auditor to notify the 
supervisory board in writing of material findings of the audit review of interim 
reports. The supervisory board should be required to review the interim report to 
determine whether it accurately reflects the assets and liabilities, financial position, 
and profits and losses of the company (or group); disclosure should be conditioned 
upon the supervisory board's approval of the interim financial statements.  ............ 
 
 
 
 
 
325 
   
The Government Panel recommends supplementing § 171(1) AktG by adding that 
each supervisory board member shall have the right to request information from 
the auditor regarding the results of the audit during the supervisory board's or the 
designated committee's negotiations. ....................................................................... 
 
 
 
326 
   
The Government Panel recommends providing that, in the future, in cases 
addressed in § 33(2) nos. 1 and 2 AktG the audit of the incorporation of the 
company may also be performed by the certifying notary public. ........................... 
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